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Abstract 
Since January 1, 1997, the wholesale electricity market in the United States has been open to 
competition. To satisfy the reciprocity requirements imposed by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, Hydro-Québec, a Canadian utility, made its transmission grid accessible to third parties. 
Under the current regulation, transmission losses are taken into account through a single, constant rate; 
location and time of use play no role.  
Hydro-Québec generates most of its electricity from hydro resources. Long high-voltage power 
lines link production in the North to consumption centers in the South, where there are interconnections 
with neighboring areas. We develop an optimization model that allows us to calculate nodal prices on the 
basis of the opportunity costs of exports. Hydro resources and interconnections with neighbors tend to 
equalize nodal prices between peak and off-peak periods. However, transmission losses give rise to large 
price differences between the northern and the southern regions. That the price differences are not taken 
into account under the current regulation has implications for siting new power stations. 
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Nodal Pricing and Transmission Losses:  
An Application to a Hydroelectric Power System 
Jean-Thomas Bernard and Chantal Guertin∗ 
Introduction 
The ongoing restructuring of the electric power industry has brought to the fore 
two topics that had received little attention in public utilities economics: governance and 
the pricing of electric power transmission services. Until the early 1990s, electricity was 
provided by vertically integrated monopolies, which were mandated to operate within an 
assigned area and were subject to government control or regulation. Now that it is 
possible to generate electricity by small natural gas turbines without incurring significant 
unit cost increases, economies of scale at the generation stage have changed, but 
transmission and distribution still have natural monopoly features.
1 Technological 
changes and public pressure to lower electricity prices have undermined the conventional 
structure of the electric power industry. England was first to privatize the whole industry, 
in 1990, and introduce competition in electricity generation. Since then, the British model 
has been adopted with modifications by several countries.
2 
Competition in electricity generation has led to the deregulation of the wholesale 
market—that is, the market between producers  and local distribution utilities. There are 
also a few cases of partial or even total retail market deregulation. Reaping the full 
benefits of competition, however, requires nondiscriminatory access to the transmission 
grid and proper pricing of transmission services. Following the pathbreaking works of 
Schweppe et al. (1988) and Hogan (1992), economists have devised optimal transmission 
pricing rules when the objective is maximization of economic surplus subject to 
production and transmission capacity constraints while taking into account line losses, 
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loop flows, and reliability criteria. The first-order conditions associated with the 
maximization of economic benefits under constraints yield the so-called nodal prices, the 
electricity prices to be paid by users and received by producers at each node to reach the 
stated objective.
3 These prices, which vary from node to node, mostly because of 
transmission line congestion and losses, can be used to determine the value of 
transmission rights.
4  
Thus far, the emphasis has been on weblike transmission networks that link load 
centers and thermal generating stations and give rise to loop flows.
5 For such networks, 
power producers have some freedom in siting new thermal power plants. Important 
factors are the load distribution over space, fuel supplies, high-voltage power line 
corridors, and environmental concerns. Hydropower stations have significantly different 
features; quite often they are located far from consumption centers and thus require long 
high-voltage transmission lines. Furthermore, because hydroelectricity is produced by the 
energy of falling water, whose flow varies over time, imports and exports with adjacent 
regions play a critical role in balancing supply and demand over the course of the year. If 
such exchanges take place with neighbors who do not have the same demand patterns, 
imports must increase during the peak period, and the flow of electricity is reversed in the 
off-peak period.  
Important features of hydro-based electric systems are  water use over the annual 
cycle and losses over the high-voltage power lines. The capacity limits of transmission 
lines from power sites to consumption centers are not so significant as they are in thermal 
systems, since transmission line capacities are compatible with upstream power plant 
capacities. However, the capacity limits of the interconnections with adjacent regions 
may still be significant.  
In this paper, we analyze a simple model of a representative hydroelectric power 
system, with long transmission lines, limited generation capacity next to large 
consumption centers, limited availability of water over the annual cycle, and 
interconnections with adjacent regions. Electricity exports and imports and transmission 
losses play key roles in determining the opportunity costs at each node. The simple model 
provides the framework for a seven-node model that is applied to Hydro-Québec, a 
government-owned utility whose total generating capacity was 36,879 MW (94.4% 
hydro) at the end of 1996.
6 The profit maximization results show that nodal price 
differences between Montréal, which is the main consumption center, and hydropower Resources for the Future                                                                            Bernard and Guertin 
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sites located more than 1,000 kilometers away can be as large as 18%. Under the current 
regulatory regime, transmission line losses are taken into account by applying a 5.2% flat 
rate to power injected into the transmission network, irrespective of time or location. This 
creates an erroneous price signal to developers seeking sites for new power plants. 
Section 1: A simple model of optimal hydropower use 
We analyze a simple three-node linear model that embodies the salient features of 
hydropower, as described above. In Figure 1, node c represents a hydropower site, 
which can produce at most EN1 megawatt-hours (MWh) because of the limited 
availability of water. There are two periods: peak, which lasts 
p T hours, and off-peak, 
which lasts 
op T hours. No electricity consumption occurs at node c; all the power 
generated there is transmitted through power line 1
r
 to node d. Production at node c, 
), , ( 1 1
op p x x  is not constrained by the capacity limits of the power plant or transmission line 
1
r
. Some hydropower ( )
op p x x 2 2 ,  is generated at node d, but this is small relative to 
consumption in both periods, with 
op p c c 2 2 > . Besides the overall constraint on electricity 
production, EN2, imposed by the availability of water, production during the peak period 
p x2  is limited by generation capacity  2 K ; no such constraint exists for off-peak 
production 
op x2 . Node e represents the interconnection with the adjacent region through 
power line 2
r
. Imports (IM ) can be purchased at price  IM P , but there is an upper bound 
IM K on imports; exports (EX ) can be sold at price  EX P , and no constraint exists within 
the range that is contemplated.
7  IM P is assumed to be less than EX P . Reservoirs allow the 
producer to purchase electricity when the import price is low and to sell when the export 
price is high. 





EX T IM P T EX P • • − • • = Π  
which results from power exchanges while taking into account the following three sets of 
constraints: 
( ) i  Capacity 
() 1 λ   IM K IM ≤   
() 2 λ   2 2 K x
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( ) ii   Energy (water availability) 
() 3 λ   1 1 1 EN x T x T
op op p p ≤ • + •  
() 4 λ   2 2 2 EN x T x T
op op p p ≤ • + •  
(iii) Peak and off-peak energy balances 
) ( 5 λ   0 ) ( ) ( 2 2 1 12 1 32 ≥ − + − + −
p p p p c x x L x IM L IM  
) ( 6 λ   ( ) [ ] 0 ) ( 2 2 1 12 1 23 2 2 1 12 1 ≥ − − + − − − + − EX c x x L x L c x x L x
op op op op op op op op  
The function  ) (ξ ij L is the power loss resulting from power flow ξ  from node i to 
node  j . The  s k' λ  are the lagrangian multipliers that appear in the lagrangian function of 
the maximization problem. They represent the shadow values of the associated 
constraining factors at the optimal solution of the choice variables. 
We assume that the constraints are binding and that an interior solution exists. 
Here are the first-order conditions that must be satisfied at the optimum: 
IM :  ( )
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From (2), we have 
op
EX T P • = 6 λ        (7) 
6 λ  is the value of one MW of power exported during the off-peak period and is equal to 
the export price multiplied by the number of off-peak hours. As we will see, this value 
enters into the opportunity cost of electricity at all the nodes during both peak and off-
peak periods. 

































EX       (8) 
3 λ  is the shadow value of electricity or water rent at the hydropower site that feeds into 





 during the off-peak period. Since production is not constrained by capacity at node c, 
it is also the opportunity cost of power during the peak period. 

















PEX        (9) 
4 λ  is the shadow value of electricity or water rent of the hydropower site located at node 
d and is equal to the export price net of power losses during the off-peak period. 
From (2), (3) and (4), we have 
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λ  (10) 
5 λ  is the opportunity cost of power used at node d during the peak period and is equal to 
the water rent at node 1, i.e.  3 λ , corrected for the marginal power loss from node 1 to 
node 2 during the peak period. 
From (5), we obtain: 
p T • − = 4 5 2 λ λ λ         (11) 
Production is assumed to be limited by capacity at note 2 during the peak period.  2 λ  is 
the shadow value of additional generating capacity at that node and is equal to the 
opportunity cost of power there during the peak period minus the water rent of the power 
site located at the node.  
Finally equation (1) yields: 
p
IM T P IM
IM
L






− • = ) ( 1
32
5 1 λ λ     (12) 
1 λ  is the shadow value of an additional unit of interconnection capacity, which is 
assumed to be binding during the peak period. It is equal to the net value of imported 
power as seen from node 2 during the peak period minus the purchase price of power at 
the border—that is,  IM P . Resources for the Future                                                                            Bernard and Guertin 
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In this model, two factors contribute to the equalization of opportunity costs of 
electricity at each node during the peak and off-peak periods. First is the limited 
availability of hydropower. As seen from (8) and (9), the water rent associated with hydro 
production at each node is the same in peak and off-peak periods, and any difference 
between peak and off-peak opportunity costs at a node reflects the effects of some other 
constraint, such as generation or transmission capacity; these constraints are binding 
during the peak period. Second is the power exchange with the neighboring area, which 
increases supply in the peak period and increases demand in the off-peak period. 
Furthermore, if the interconnection with the neighbor is close to the main consumption 
center, as is assumed here, transmission losses tend to decrease in the peak period and 
increase in the off-peak period. An added benefit of the interconnection is thus the saving 
on transmission losses. 
In the following section we will expand that simple model to build a 
representation of Hydro-Québec’s electric network in January 1997, when the U.S. 
wholesale market was opened to competition. The immediate purpose of the expanded 
applied model is to compute the opportunity costs of power at different nodes during 
peak and off-peak periods. The theoretical results from the simple three-node model will 
help us interpret the simulation results in the expanded model. 
Section 2: A simulation model of Hydro-Québec 
Although the economics literature on optimal nodal pricing is now well 
developed, only a small number of applications embodying its principles have been 
implemented so far.
8 Very few studies have dealt with the empirical implications of 
different transmission pricing methods.
9  
In this paper we focus mainly on transmission losses, limited availability of water, 
and power exchanges with adjacent areas. We neglect some other elements that have 
been highlighted in previous studies on transmission pricing—namely, line congestion 
and loop flows. These two elements of electricity transmission are not so important for 
hydro-based electric networks when hydropower sites are located far from consumption 
centers.
10  
In this section, we first describe the broader context of the wholesale electricity 
market deregulation that is taking place in the United States and its effects on Canadian Resources for the Future                                                                            Bernard and Guertin 
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utilities. This is followed by the presentation of some basic facts about Hydro-Québec. 
Finally, we show how the available data were used to construct the simulation model. 
2.1 The deregulation of the U.S. wholesale electricity market 
The wholesale electricity market in the United States has been open to 
competition since January 1, 1997. Through its Order 888, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) allowed producers, local distribution utilities, and any FERC-
licensed marketers to exchange electricity at market prices. This implies that transmission 
lines must be open to all interested parties in a nondiscriminatory fashion at agreed price 
schemes. 
FERC did not dictate specific pricing schemes for transmission services; rather, it 
relied upon proposals from interested parties as long as the pricing schemes embodied the 
general principles of open access to third parties at nondiscriminatory rates. Thus far, 
three broad methods have been applied to determine transmission rates: flat rate or 
average cost pricing; zonal rates, which are simply flat rates albeit over small areas; and 
finally nodal prices, which reflect the marginal costs of producing electricity at various 
nodes over a network. It should be pointed out that transmission line losses have received 
little attention from regulatory agencies. 
Hydro-Québec applied to FERC for a license to operate as a wholesale marketer 
in the U.S. market and won approval in late 1997.
11 FERC has imposed some reciprocity 
conditions and requires foreign applicants to open their transmission networks along the 
lines adopted for the U.S. wholesale market. To satisfy these conditions, Hydro-Québec 
created a new division, TransÉnergie, which manages all its transmission assets, and the 
Québec government set the conditions and the rates for open access to the transmission 
network.
12 The government chose one flat rate, which applies to the whole province and 
does not vary with time of use. The same approach is taken with line losses. 
In December 1996, the Québec government created a public utility commission, 
la Régie de l’énergie, which now has the mandate to approve transmission rates along 
certain guidelines. Under the proposal of TransÉnergie, a single flat rate of 5.2% would 
be applied to account for transmission losses; that is, the supplier must provide 1.052 
kWh for every kWh to be delivered. Resources for the Future                                                                            Bernard and Guertin 
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2.2 Hydro-Québec: An overview
13 
Hydro-Québec is a government-owned utility that provides electricity to most 
users in the province of Québec.
14 In 1996,
15 the vertically integrated utility sold 
144.5 TWh to local customers and 19.0 TWh to utilities operating outside the province. 
Total generation, transmission, and distribution losses were 12.3 TWh. Peak demand 
reached 31,245 MW in winter because of electric heating; the summer months are part of 
the off-peak period. The available capacity was 36,679 MW at year’s end, and the hydro 
share (34,613 MW) was 94.4%.
16 One nuclear plant (675 MW) and fuel oil power plants 
of various sizes (1,391 MW) account for the remaining capacity.  
The Hydro-Québec network is interconnected with adjacent regions: Ontario 
(1,462 MW), New Brunswick (1,050 MW), New York (2,675 MW), and New England 
(2,300 MW), for a total of 7,487 MW. Because some equipment is used jointly by New 
York and Ontario, the simultaneous capacity is limited to 6,337 MW.
17 Peak demands in 
New York and New England occur during the summer months. Except for a long-term 
contract (65 years) to purchase electricity from Labrador, Newfoundland, Hydro-Québec 
bought little electricity from producers outside the province; the interconnections were 
used mostly to export power through both long-term contracts (9.6 TWh) and short-term 
ones (9.4 TWh). On average, Hydro-Québec has been selling more than 10% of its 
production to its neighbors.  
As Figure 2 shows, very large hydro power sites located in the northern part of the 
province provide the bulk of the hydro capacity: James Bay on the western side with 
14,790 MW, and Churchill Falls–Manicouagan-Outardes on the eastern side, with 
12,060 MW. Other significant albeit smaller hydro power plants are located in the Trois-
Rivières district and on the St. Lawrence River upstream from Montréal. The bulk of the 
consumption, as well as exports, takes place in the southern part of the province, and 
high-voltage power lines link production in the North to consumption centers in the 
South. Some 11,000 kilometers of 735 kV power lines form the backbone of Hydro-
Québec’s transmission network. Once power reaches the consumption centers, it is 
transmitted and distributed at lower voltage. 
2.3 The simulation model 
The hydro power network shown in Figure 2 is highly complex. To create a 
simplified model that nevertheless preserves the main characteristics of the network—Resources for the Future                                                                            Bernard and Guertin 
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long high-voltage power lines, line losses during peak and off-peak use, variations in the 
availability of water over the annual cycle, and interconnections with adjacent areas in 
the southern part of the province—we make several assumptions.
18 
From administrative districts to nodes 
Hydro-Québec high-voltage transmission network is simplified in such a way that 
each node corresponds to an administrative district (or set of administrative districts) 
linked by power lines. In this way, the model represents power exchanges between the 
districts. Table 1 shows the relationships between Hydro-Québec administrative districts 
in 1996 and the nodes in the simplified model
19; Figure 3 illustrates those nodes, the 
lines, and their length.
20 
Transmission network and power losses 
We assume that there is no congestion over the whole network except at the 
border, and that all the lines have the same voltage, 735 kV. Power loss (MW) along the 
line i
r
 through heat dissipation is determined by the following function:  
 
2
2 ) ( i i i D
V
R
L ξ ξ • • =  
where    
i ξ  =  power input (MW) into linei
r
; 
R  =  line resistance per km (Ohms/km); 
V  =  voltage (kV); 
i D =  length of line i
r
(km). 
Since voltage and line length are given, R  has been computed with the calculated 
power flows between districts during peak and off-peak periods in 1996 and with an 
average loss factor of 5.2% over total power availability. Our estimate of R is 0.00654. 
Demand 
There are two time periods: peak, which lasts 300 hours, and off-peak, which lasts 
8,460 hours. Demand is constant within each period. Given the peak demand in 1996, 
off-peak demand is adjusted so that Hydro-Québec’s annual sales match the sum of peak 
and off-peak demands. The district (node) shares of consumption within each period are Resources for the Future                                                                            Bernard and Guertin 
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the same as the annual shares. Table 2 shows the 1996 actual electricity sales by district
21 
and the corresponding estimates during peak and off-peak periods. Most of the electricity 
sales occur in the South: the Montréal district accounts for 63.4%, followed by the 
Québec district, with 24.9%. 
Generating capacity and hydropower output 
Table 3 shows the installed generating capacity and hydropower output by district 
in 1996. Hydropower stations, which accounted for 94.4% of the installed capacity, 
produced 168,318 GWh in that year. The nuclear station (675 MW) is considered a must-
run unit over the whole year.
22 Reflecting their current use, the fuel oil power plants are 
assumed to operate at maximum capacity during the peak period and to be shut down 
during the off-peak period. 
Import and export prices 
On the basis of Hydro-Québec’s experience since the opening of the U.S. 
wholesale electricity market in 1997, the import price is taken to be $40 per MWh, and 
the export price is set at $50 per MWh.
23 
Section 3: Results 
Hydro-Québec’s net profit from export and import is maximized subject to local 
consumption during peak and off-peak periods while taking into account the available 
hydroelectricity, generating capacity constraints, nuclear and thermal production, 
interconnection capacities, and power losses over the transmission lines. The decision 
variables are imports, exports, and hydropower generation at each node during peak and 
off-peak periods. The program MAPLE 7 is used to solve the maximization problem; the 
results appear in Table 4.  
Output reaches the maximum capacity level at the Montréal node g and at the 
Trois-Rivières node f during the peak period, and imports reach the upper limit of the 
interconnection capacity at that time. Gross exports are 3,374 MW, less than the 
maximum. This implies that water used to produce electricity is a scarce resource. Total 
profit is $1.385 billion. We observe that the relative difference between peak and off-
peak production is smaller at nodes located farther from the main consumption centers in 
the South than at nodes that are nearer. This result comes from the additional supply Resources for the Future                                                                            Bernard and Guertin 
11 
through imports during the peak period and the minimization of power losses over the 
transmission lines. It turns out that there is no difference between peak and off-peak 
production for Churchill Falls, which is node c. The marginal power losses reveal the 










Table 4 also shows the nodal prices that are set equal to the opportunity costs of 
power at each node. The export price and the marginal losses are the determining factors. 
When there are no capacity constraints on production, as at nodes c, d, and h, there are 
no differences between peak and off-peak nodal prices because hydroelectricity can be 
moved freely from one period to the other. When production reaches the capacity limit, 
as at nodes f and g, however, a price discrepancy between peak and off-peak periods 
arises, and it shows the shadow value of additional production capacity at these nodes.
24 
Similarly, the difference between the nodal price of import ($50.21 per MWh) and the 
price paid to purchase imported power ($40 per MWh) is the shadow value of additional 
interconnection capacity. 
Under the current regulatory regime, a single flat rate of 5.2% applies to all power 
that is injected into the transmission network to compensate for transmission losses. This 
means that the net export price is perceived by producers to be $47.53 per MWh. We can 
see from Table 4 that this price is too low relative to the nodal prices in the southern 
region, where most of the consumption takes place, and too high in the northern region. 
This provides an erroneous price signal to developers about where additional plants 
should be located.
25, 26 There is no incentive to build new plants in the southern part of 
the province, where the opportunity costs are the highest. 
If consumption and production of electricity at each node are valued at their 
respective opportunity costs—that is, at their nodal prices as presented in Table 4—the 
annual profit is $336 million. This amount falls short of the total revenue requirements of 
TransÉnergie, which were estimated by Gouvernement du Québec (1997) at 
$2.260 billion. Some other ways to pay for the capital and operational costs of the 
transmission network need to be implemented to supplement the income associated with 
nodal pricing.
27 
If hydroelectric production at each node is priced at its respective opportunity 
cost, the gross annual hydroelectric rent is estimated to be $7.372.4 billion, and the rent 
net of capital and operation costs is estimated to be $2.788.1 billion.
28 This amount is Resources for the Future                                                                            Bernard and Guertin 
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larger than the net annual income of $1.078 billion realized by Hydro-Québec in 2000, 
which also includes the return on the book value of equity of $14.280 billion.
29 
Conclusion 
The ongoing deregulation of electricity production has opened a new field of 
research focusing on ways to organize and price power transmission services. In this 
paper, we analyze a simple model that embodies the salient features of large hydro-based 
electric networks, with limited availability of water over the annual cycle, long lines from 
production to consumption, and imports and exports with neighboring areas to even out 
supply and demand. The model shows that the limited availability of water behind the 
dams tends to equalize nodal prices between peak and off-peak periods and that 
interconnections with adjacent regions further contribute to such an equalization. This 
simple model is then applied to the province of Québec, which gets most of its power 
from hydro resources. The profit maximization results show fairly significant nodal price 
differences between the southern region, where most of the consumption takes place, and 
the northern region, where hydro production occurs. Under the current regulation, power 
losses are taken into account through a fixed rate applied to all power injected into the 
system. This provides an erroneous price signal about desirable locations for new 
generation equipment. Siting new plants will become more important in the future 
because there are few hydro resources left to be developed in the province of Québec and 
natural gas–fired units are expected to make a growing contribution.
30 
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Figure 2. Québec’s electric power network 
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Table 1. Relationship between Hydro-Québec administrative districts in 1996 and 
nodes in the simple model 
 
Node   
Number  Name  Administrative district in 1996 
1 Churchill  Falls   
2 Manic  Manicouagan 
3 Québec  Montmorency 
Saguenay
a 
4 Trois-Rivières  Mauricie
b 
5 Montréal  Maisonneuve 
Richelieu 
Laurentides 
6  James Bay  La Grande Rivière 
Saguenay
b 
7 Export/import  External  markets 
a Consumption only. 
b Production only. 
Source: Hydro-Québec (1997b). Resources for the Future                                                                            Bernard and Guertin 
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Table 2. Sales and estimated peak and off-peak demand in 1996 
 




Number  Name  GWh  Share (%)  Peak  Off-peak 
1 Churchill 
Falls 
0 0.0  0  0 
2 Manic  10690  7.8  2,278  1,190 
3 Québec  34386  24.9  7,271  3,799 
4 Trois-Rivières  0  0.0  0  0 
5 Montréal  87403  63.4  18,513  9,673 
6 James  Bay  5353  3.9  1,139  595 
           0  3,398 
Total 137,832  100.0  29,201  18,655 
Source: Hydro-Québec (1997b) Resources for the Future                                                                            Bernard and Guertin 
18 
Table 3. Generating capacity and hydroelectricity production in 1996 
 
Node  Generating capacity
 (MW)  Hydro production (GWh) 
Number  Name  Hydro  Thermal  Nuclear  Total  Share (%)  GWh  Share (%) 
1 Churchill  Falls 5,428  0  0 5,428  14.8  26,552  15.8 
2 Manic  8,599  0  0  8,599 23.5  37,257  22.1 
3  Québec  0 0  0 0  0.0 0  0.0 
4  Trois-Rivières  1,636  428  675 2,739  9.1 8,303  4.9 
5 Montréal  3,252  801  0  4,053  9.4  19,975  11.9 
6  James  Bay  15,698  162  0 15,860  43.2 76,221  45.3 
 Total  34,613 1,391  675  36,679 100.0  168  318,  100.0 
Share  (%)  94.4  3.8  1.8  100.0 - -  - 
Source: Hydro-Québec (1997b). 
 Resources for the Future                                                                            Bernard and Guertin 
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Table 4. Optimization results 
 
Node  Production (MW)  Gross transfer (MW)  Marginal losses (%)  Nodal prices ($/MWh) 
  Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak Peak Off-peak 
c  3,032 3,032 3,032 3,032  4.55  4.55 44.51 44.51 
d  7,628 4,133 8,313 5,907  7.63  5.42 46.54 46.54 
e  0  0  725 1,947  0.19  0.52 50.09 49.06 
f  2,739 1,598 3,463 3,541  0.91  0.93 50.19 49.32 
g  4,053 2,246  0  3,374
a —  0.46  50.53  49.77 
h  9,868 8,665 8,729 8,070 21.27 19.67 41.59 41.59 
i  3,220  0  3,220 —  0.44 —  50.21  50.00 
a Net exports are 3,366 MW. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 For an early investigation of the empirical evidence on the extent of economies of scale in electricity generation, 
see Joskow and Schmalensee (1983). 
2 Although there were earlier experiments in, for example, Chile, the British policy change is considered the start of 
the new era of electricity market deregulation. See papers in Gilbert and Kahn (1996). 
3 A node is a consumption center, a producer or set of producers, or a set of high voltage power lines that meet at 
one point. 
4  Hsu (1997) presents a survey of the literature on transmission pricing. See also papers in the Journal of 
Regulatory Economics (1996) and Utilities Policy (1997). 
5  The three-node triangular network provides the standard illustration. 
6  More information on Hydro-Québec will be provided in section 2. 
7  Import and export capacity limits do not have to be equal, since they depend on the state of the two neighboring 
electrical systems. If exports reached the capacity limit, this would imply that hydropower was a substitute for 
imports. Then the import price would determine the opportunity cost of hydroelectricity. 
8  Exceptions are New Zealand and the Pennsylvania–New-Jersey–Maryland (PJM) area in the United States. More 
recently, New York and New England power pools have adopted regulatory regimes for the pricing of transmission 
services that encompass elements of optimal nodal pricing. 
9 One exception is Green (1998), who applies the optimizing approach to the England and Wales electricity system 
while taking into account transmission capacity constraints and line losses under four pricing regimes of 
transmission services: nodal pricing, which is taken as the first best case; one uniform price for consumers and nodal 
prices for producers; nodal prices for consumers and one uniform price for producers; and finally, uniform prices for 
both consumers and producers. Congestion and transmission line losses are the major factors that lead to price 
differences between the northern area, which is a net supplier, and the southern area, where the bulk of the demand 
occurs. 
10 Besides Hydro-Québec, British Columbia Hydro and Manitoba Hydro are two other Canadian utilities with 
transmission networks linking hydropower sites located far from consumption centers. 
11 Until then, Hydro-Québec was selling electricity at border points. 
12 Gouvernement du Québec (1997). 
13 The information presented in this section comes from Hydro-Québec (1997a, 1997b). 
14 There are nine municipal distribution utilities that purchase electricity from the Hydro-Québec; they service less 
than 4% of demand. Private producers, Alcan being the largest, generate another 2,864 MW (96% hydro), mostly for 
their own use.  
15 The most recent year for which district consumption and production data are available is 1996. 
16 This includes the 5,428 MW hydro power plant located at Churchill Falls in Labrador, Newfoundland. Through a 
long-term contract, Hydro-Québec gets nearly all the output from this plant. 
17 According to information provided by TransÉnergie, the effective export capacity is approximately 5,500 MW, 
and the effective import capacity is approximately 3,220 MW. 
18 Detailed information on the computation of consumption and production at each node appears in Guertin (2000). Resources for the Future  Bernard and Guertin 
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19 The Matapedia district is omitted because it includes the Gaspé Peninsula and a set of small, isolated networks 
outside the area served by the main network. It represents less than 0.5% of generation capacity and 4% of annual 
sales. 
20 The approximate distances in kilometers between substations have been provided by TransÉnergie: line1
r
, 
Churchill-Manicouagan (619 km); line2
r
, Manicouagan–Lévis (379 km); line3
r
 Lévis–Nicolet (110 km); line 4
r
, 
Nicolet–Boucherville (Montréal) (108 km); line5
r
, LG2–Chénier (Montréal) (1,006 km); line6
r
, Châteauguay 
(Montréal)–Massena (New York) (56 km). 
21 There are no electricity sales in the Trois-Rivières district because in 1996 they were recorded in the Montréal and 
the Québec districts. 
22 Its load factor was 94.4% in 1996. 
23 All figures are in Canadian dollars. 
24 Although no production takes place at node e, prices also differ between the peak and off-peak periods through a 
ripple effect from the constrained nodes. 
25 Bernard and Doucet (1999) argued that the average cost pricing of transmission services can lead to misleading 
price signals for large hydro-based power networks that have long high-voltage transmission lines between 
generation sites and consumption centers. However, they presented no information on the empirical significance of 
this effect. 
26 The pricing of transmission losses is only one component of the prices associated with transmission services. 
Under the current regulation regime, average cost pricing is applied to take into account capital and operation costs. 
Again, location and time of use play no role. 
27 Green (1998) arrives at the same conclusion. 
28 With 8% as discount rate, the present value is $34.851 billion. 
29 This rent is dissipated through low electricity rates to Hydro-Québec local customers. Bernard and Chatel (1985) 
measured the welfare losses associated with the method of dissipating rents, and Bernard and Roland (1997) explain 
how electricity provided by a government-owned enterprise, as is the case here, can result in social equilibrium.  
30 Hydro-Québec (2001b). 